(Only document I had is a report Reed wrote, programming recommendations and some other basic info is absent)
Azerbaijan PERFORM Year Two (Malign Influence) 2022 Case Study

Practice Area: Counter Malign Influnce

Donor/Client: USAID

Partner: Lumbee Tribal Enterprises

Location: Baku, Azerbaijan

Surveys: 3,000

Project Objectives

- ***Project Objective 1:*** *Understand and provide analysis on malign actors' influence on Azerbaijan's democratic institutions, policy, and civil society.*

- ***Project Objective 2:*** *Understand and provide analysis on disinformation by China and Iran and public awareness.*

- ***Project Objective 3:*** *Understand and provide analysis on regional energy sector dynamics between Azerbaijan and other oil producing nations.*

- ***Project Objective 4:*** *Understand and provide analysis on the impact of malign actors on Azerbaijan's non-oil economy (imports and export).*

- ***Project Objective 5:*** *Understand and provide analysis of malign actor influence on social dynamics (including religion, language, and foreign nation favorability).*

Key Findings

- The most important vector of Chinese malign influence is the relationship between President's Aliyev and Xi. Xi seeks allies in re-shaping international institutions away from US hegemony and seeks support for PRCs national priorities.
- The Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps employs Azerbaijani proxy group Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan or the "Huseyniyyun'' to conduct propaganda and protests in support of repressed Shia movements such as the Muslim Unity Movement (MUM) in a failed effort to effect GOAZ policy toward the fundamentalist Shia community.

Methodology

- **Desk Review**: PERFORM searched government websites, news media, and social media from China, Iran and Azerbaijan, and analytical reporting by foreign policy experts to collect the bulk of qualitative data presented in this report.

- **Disinformation Database**: PERFORM cataloged 125 instances of propaganda or disinformation targeting an Azerbaijani audience or about US activities in Iran.

- **Indicator Collection**: Contextual indicators were collected to quantify the strength of the relationship between Azerbaijan and malign actors. Indicators include diplomatic interactions, media usage, energy exports, trade volumes, foreign direct investment, remittances, and student exchanges.

- **Key informant interview**s: Due to heightened political sensitivity and security issues, the Mission requested that PERFORM forgo KIIs this year. This led to a loss of important contextual analysis and valuable alternate points of view, though this report includes information produced by many of the stakeholders that we planned to interview.